Disinformation Commission rapid assessment

The Kaliningrad drone scare and the claims aimed at Poland 22 Nov 2026



Posts pushing at least one of the four false claims each hour, by platform, 21 to 22 November 2026 (UK time). Source: Our coding of 4,060 posts from X, Telegram and other platforms; 1,007 push a claim [C42].

Pro-Kremlin channels blamed NATO and Poland hours before Kaliningrad's alarm sounded

Poland's disinformation centre listed four false claims after drones were reported over Kaliningrad [C1]. We traced them across 4,060 posts. The blame-NATO line ran on Russian Telegram from 10:31 on 21 November, hours before the governor named Lithuania [C9, C4]. Most reach was in Russian, and the German-troops claim stayed small.

Did the claims follow the incident or come first?

98

posts pushing them appeared before Kaliningrad's governor mentioned Lithuania. See Section 3, p.7

[C42]

Was any of it coordinated?

155

Telegram channels posted identical text within 10 seconds of each other; 80 use famous Russian names. See Section 5, p.9

[C42]

How much was in Polish?

0.2m

of 8.8 million views on posts pushing the claims; Russian-language posts took 5.8 million. See Section 4, p.8

[C42]

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01

Results at a glance

Our assessment

The four claims did not grow out of the Kaliningrad alert. Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels were already calling the morning's drone strike on the Sparta II a NATO blockade, and saying drones flew through Poland and Lithuania, hours before the governor tied the alert to "an object from Lithuania" [C9, C10, C4]. His statement then gave the claims an official peg. Russian-language Telegram carried most of the reach, led by Anatoly Shariy, Alexander Kots and Yuri Podolyaka; English-language X added large accounts, one with a record of false claims about Poland; Polish-language posts were a small share [C12, C10, C11, C21, C42]. We also found a network of look-alike Telegram channels posting the same text within a second, and Pravda network sites turning the claims into Polish and Lithuanian [C42, C26, C28]. We could not reproduce Poland's estimate of at least 19 million reach [C2].

Strong indicator	We found 98 posts pushing the claims before 17:12 UK on 21 November, when the governor's line was first relayed; the earliest about the incident, at 10:31, said drones flew "through Poland and Lithuania, making them participants", and 37 copied Kots's 13:57 "blockade rehearsal" post [C9, C10, C42]. Our assessment: it is highly likely (about 80% to 90%) that the blame-NATO frame was set in advance by pro-Kremlin channels, not drawn from evidence about the Kaliningrad incident. We have high confidence: the platforms timestamp each post.	Section 3
Strong indicator	Posts pushing the claims drew 8.8 million views in our sample; Russian-language posts took 5.8 million, English 2.3 million and Polish 0.2 million [C42]. Our assessment: it is likely (about 55% to 75%) that most people who met the claims did so in Russian or English, not in a Polish-language campaign. We have moderate confidence: our data is a sample and views are not unique readers.	Section 4
Strong indicator	A network of 155 Telegram channels posted identical text within 10 seconds of each other 23 times; 80 carry the names of Russian commentators, officials or broadcasters, and seven of the bursts pushed a claim, including a German-troops post from 14 channels at the same second [C42]. Our assessment: it is highly likely (about 80% to 90%) that these channels are run centrally and pose as public figures. We have high confidence: posting times match to the second.	Section 5
Confirmed	Pravda network sites in Polish and Lithuanian republished Russian channels' claims, including Kots's blockade post, one within six minutes; the network shares one Yandex Metrica counter and is named by the EEAS, DFRLab and Google [C26, C28, C34, C35, C36]. Our assessment: it is almost certain (about 95% or more) that this was automated republication. We have high confidence: each article names its Telegram source.	Section 6

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Strong indicator	The German-troops claim stayed small: 224 posts on X, with its Polish wording first posted at 21:08 by a six-month-old account with about 900 followers, attached to a screenshot of a large English-language account's post [C42, C21]. Our assessment: it is likely (about 55% to 75%) that the Polish version began as a domestic fringe remix of Russian hints about German drones and aircraft. We have moderate confidence: earlier versions could sit in closed groups.	Section 3

Why it matters

Kaliningrad sits between Poland and Lithuania, and Russia's foreign ministry claimed in October that Poland was planning strikes on Kaliningrad and promised a "scorching" response to any attack [C7]. A claim that Poles, Lithuanians or German troops struck Russian soil gives Moscow a ready pretext and tries to split Poles from Ukraine. Knowing that the frame came first, from a known set of channels, lets officials answer it at the source before the next incident.

How to read the findings

Each finding opens with its evidence label. Confirmed means a reproducible primary source or measurement. Strong indicator means a pattern across several measures. Insufficient evidence means we could not see enough to judge. The likelihood term follows the UK Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment yardstick, and the confidence sentence says how much the evidence supports it. Who flew the drones, and whether anything hit Baltiysk, is not established; we take no view on it.

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02

What happened

On the morning of 21 November two drones hit the Sparta II, a Russian cargo ship sailing to Kaliningrad, in neutral waters of the Gulf of Finland; Finland's defence forces later said Ukraine was the likely attacker [C44]. That evening Kaliningrad's governor, Alexei Besprozvannykh, said the "drone danger" system in Neman district had reacted to "a suspicious object from Lithuania", and that there was no threat [C4]. Sirens then sounded in parts of the region, and Russian channels reported air defence fire and explosions in Baltiysk, home of the Baltic Fleet; no explosion has been confirmed [C5]. A photo shared as the Baltiysk blast showed a strike on Iran's Qeshm Island [C25, C5].

Lithuania's crisis centre said its air force detected no drones and that Russian claims might aim to make it look as if Lithuania or NATO helped; its chief later said the fire photos came from Iran [C5]. Foreign minister Kęstutis Budrys rejected "false claims circulating on social media" at 22:40 UK [C3]. On 22 November at 06:57 Paweł Olszewski, Poland's deputy digital minister, who runs the Centre for Countering Disinformation, listed four Russian false claims [C1, C8]. Polish media reported the list widely, and Lithuania's denial with it [C31, C32]. At 15:10 he said reach had risen to "at least over 19 million" and that the claim of Poland and NATO being dragged into war prevailed [C2].

Table 1. Key moments, 21 and 22 November 2026 (UK time)

Time	Who	What
21 Nov 10:31	condottieros, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel	Drones flew "through Poland and Lithuania, making them participants"; debris "will show" German, British or French drones [C9]
21 Nov 12:05	mikle1on, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel	"NATO, hiding behind the fig leaf of the Kyiv junta, has begun a physical blockade" of Kaliningrad [C13]
21 Nov 13:50	RT on Telegram	A German Air Force aircraft "monitored" the area before the ship attack [C16]
21 Nov 13:57	Alexander Kots, war correspondent	"Rehearsal of a Kaliningrad blockade. Act one. Naval"; 710,119 views [C10]
21 Nov 14:09	Yuri Podolyaka	Same text word for word; 523,981 views [C11]
By 17:12	Governor, relayed by Izvestia at 17:39	Alert caused by "a suspicious object from Lithuania" [C4]
21 Nov 18:48	Anatoly Shariy	"You can only fly into Kaliningrad through Poland or Lithuania. So, most likely, with their consent"; 885,179 views [C12]
21 Nov 18:53	Ethan Levins on X	Drones came from "NATO territory"; "This is World War 3"; 127,670 views [C21]
21 Nov 18:54	Glenn Diesen on X	"Russia could be under NATO attack"; 401,400 views [C23]
21 Nov 21:08	Small Polish account on X	"German troops in Poland coordinate the Ukrainian attack on Królewiec from Polish territory" [C42]
21 Nov 22:40	Kęstutis Budrys	Lithuania "categorically rejects false claims" [C3]
22 Nov 05:00	Pravda Polska	Polish translation, six minutes after the Russian original, of a claim that the West hides use of Baltic airspace [C26, C46]
22 Nov 06:57	Paweł Olszewski	Lists the four claims [C1]

Time	Who	What
22 Nov 15:10	Paweł Olszewski	Reach "at least over 19 million" [C2]

Posts and articles cited; times converted to UK time (UTC). Views as collected on 22 Nov.

On X, posts mentioning Kaliningrad, including reposts, jumped from under 100 an hour to 4,876 in the 19:00 hour on 21 November; 53,663 of the 57,231 we counted from 00:00 on 20 November came after 16:00 on 21 November [C42].

03

Where each claim began

We coded 4,060 posts from 21 November to about 20:00 on 22 November for whether the author pushed each claim, relayed it as news, or rebutted it [C42]. The table gives the first post we found that pushed each claim and its largest carriers.

Table 2. First appearance and main carriers of each claim

Claim	First seen	Main carriers
1. German troops in Poland coordinate the attack	Russian hint at 10:31 that debris would prove German drones [C9]; Polish wording at 21:08 on X [C42]	RT's German-aircraft post [C16]; a small Polish account's post at 21:12 with 13,370 views [C42]; look-alike channels on 22 Nov tying the German exercise to the incident [C42]
2. Lithuanians and Poles attack Russia	10:31, condottieros on Telegram [C9]	Shariy, 885,179 views [C12]; Diesen and Levins on X [C23, C21]; Russia-focused news account runews, 100,172 views [C24]
3. Ukraine attacks to drag Poland into war	08:05, mikle1on: Poland is "pumping up" its public for war [C42]	Kots and Podolyaka [C10, C11]; Taynaya Kantselyariya, 201,642 views [C14]; Legitimny, 265,000 views [C15]
4. NATO attacked Kaliningrad	12:05, mikle1on's "physical blockade" [C13]	Kots's blockade post, copied by 81 other channels [C10, C42]; Barantchik's "tested for a blockade" [C20]; two English-language accounts saying NATO had struck, with about 200,000 views each [C42]

Our coding of 4,060 posts [C42]. Times are 21 November, UK time.

The ship attack, not the Kaliningrad alert, was the trigger. Russian state media first reported it at 10:08 [C42]. Within 23 minutes condottieros, an anonymous channel, had placed drones over Poland and Lithuania, and within four hours Kots, with 469,000 subscribers, called it the first act of a NATO blockade [C9, C10, C13]. When the governor named Lithuania that evening, the claim had an official source to point to, and the volume more than doubled within two hours [C4, C42].

The German claim, the most specific to Poland, had two strands. Russian channels hinted at German involvement: debris "will show" German drones, and RT reported a German Air Force aircraft over the gulf [C9, C16]. The Polish wording came later. At 21:08 on 21 November a Polish account created in May 2026, with about 900 followers, posted that "German troops in Poland coordinate the Ukrainian attack on Królewiec", almost word for word Olszewski's first item, with a screenshot of Levins's post [C42, C1]. It played on real news: German forces were moving to Lithuania for the NATO exercise Grand Eagle 26, and German media reported the Bundeswehr had switched from road convoys to rail to avoid handing Moscow "a propaganda gift" [C30]. X showed only 224 posts linked to the German claim in all [C42].

04

How far it travelled

Of the 4,060 posts we coded, 1,007 pushed at least one claim, with 8.8 million views between them [C42]. A hand check of 40 at random found 30 that clearly pushed a claim; the rest were mostly relays of NATO reconnaissance-flight reports or news, so the true figure is likely lower [C42].

Figure 1. Most views on the claims were in Russian



Our coding of 4,060 posts; a post can push more than one claim [C42].

Telegram took 5.6 million of the 8.8 million views and X 2.6 million [C42]. Russian-language posts drew 5.8 million and Polish-language posts 0.2 million; we found only three Lithuanian-language posts pushing a claim [C42]. The most-viewed Polish posts were by domestic accounts that asked whether Poland had let drones cross its airspace; one with about 23,000 followers said the drones must have spent "at least eight hours" over Poland [C42].

Olszewski's "at least over 19 million" cannot be checked from what is public; his centre has not said how it was counted [C2]. Across all languages and platforms our sample reaches 8.8 million views, and the official X count for all Kaliningrad posts in Polish was 3,888 [C42]. Different methods, such as counting followers rather than views, would give much larger numbers.

05

Coordination and authenticity

We looked for identical or near-identical text from different accounts within 60 seconds or one hour, account age against the baseline, and shared infrastructure. We separate coordinated behaviour from who directed it.

5.1 A copy chain

Kots's "blockade rehearsal" post was copied, not forwarded, by 81 other Telegram channels: 84 posts with the original, 23 within its first hour, with 1.41 million views in all [C42]. Podolyaka, with 2.66 million subscribers, ran it 12 minutes later [C11]. Lenta.ru wrote up Kots's view the next day [C45]. Copying a large war correspondent is how pro-Kremlin Telegram normally works, so we treat it as relay rather than a hidden campaign.

5.2 Look-alike channels posting in the same second

The stronger signal is a set of channels that post the same text at the same moment.

Figure 2. 155 Telegram channels posted identical text within seconds of each other



Our analysis of 1,849 Telegram posts [C42].

We found 23 bursts in which three or more channels posted identical text within 10 seconds, involving 155 channels [C42]. Eighty use the names of Russian commentators, officials or broadcasters, such as Podolyaka, Kots, Apti Alaudinov, Sergei Surovikin, Alexander Sladkov or Olga Skabeeva, with labels like "Main" or "Analysis"; none is the person's main channel, and their median listed audience is 18,245 [C42]. At 19:59:01 on 22 November, 14 of them posted the same article mocking Germany's switch from road to rail for Grand Eagle 26 and comparing it with German deception before the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, a gloss on the German theme; together they list 369,806 subscribers but drew 74 views [C42]. That gap between subscribers and views points to bought or inactive audiences. By our coding, seven of the 23 bursts pushed a claim; the rest carried news of the ship attack [C42]. We could not tell who runs the network.

5.3 X

On X the claims were carried by large, named accounts rather than new ones. Accounts under a year old wrote 10% of posts pushing a claim and 10% of all posts we collected [C42]. The largest English-language carriers were Glenn Diesen, a Norwegian professor, with 401,400 views; Ethan Levins, whom DFRLab found was first to post a false "Ukraine attacked Poland" video in 2025, with 127,670 views; and runews, with 100,172 [C23, C21, C33, C24]. An account with under 3,000 followers drew 207,571 views for a post headed "NATO strikes Russia" [C42]. Levins followed his first post by saying Ukraine was doing this to Russia "with Poland" [C22].

We tested three explanations.

Table 3. Competing explanations

Explanation	Evidence for	Evidence against
A frame prepared by pro-Kremlin channels, then pegged to the governor's statement	98 claim posts before the alert; copy chain from Kots; claims ran from the ship attack [C9, C10, C42]	No order or brief seen
A spontaneous reaction to the governor's words	Volume doubled after 17:12 [C42]	The frames predate his statement [C9, C13]
A covert network of fake accounts driving the claims	Synchronised look-alike channels [C42]	They drew few views; most reach came from real, named channels and accounts [C12, C10, C42]

Our analysis.

The first explanation has the fewest inconsistencies. Key assumptions: that the search tools returned a fair sample of early posts, and that Telegram timestamps are reliable. If earlier posts exist on closed channels, the pre-alert finding would only grow stronger. In DISARM terms, the activity matches T0084 (reuse existing content), T0119 (cross-posting), T0097 (create personas, for the look-alike channels) and T0085 (develop text-based content).

06

Links to known networks

6.1 The Pravda network

The Telegram channel Voennaya Khronika (warhronika), with 307,000 subscribers, posted "What happened in Kaliningrad?" at 04:54 UK on 22 November, arguing that the West is hiding the use of Baltic airspace [C46]. Pravda Polska had it in Polish at 05:00, six minutes later; 38 Telegram channels copied it, including Boris Rozhin at 08:45, and Tsargrad ran the same argument at 06:36 [C26, C17, C18, C42]. Another Pravda Polska article asked whether a German Rheinmetall launcher bought for the German brigade in Lithuania "is what attacks our ships in the Baltic" [C27]. Pravda's Lithuanian site translated Kots's blockade post, and a Yury Barantchik post using the Iran photo to wave the whole episode away as a Ukrainian information operation [C28, C29]. We found no Kaliningrad items on the front page of Pravda's German site.

6.2 Matches against takedown and threat reports

We checked every channel, account and site above against reports from Meta, OpenAI, Google, Microsoft, TikTok, the EEAS and DFRLab.

Table 4. Matches against takedown and threat reports

Actor	Match	Report
Pravda network sites	Yes	EEAS 4th threat report, March 2026; DFRLab, March 2025; Google Threat Intelligence, October 2025 [C34, C35, C36]
Ethan Levins	Named in research, not a takedown	DFRLab, December 2025 [C33]
Kots, Podolyaka, Tsargrad	Not a takedown; under EU sanctions	OpenSanctions records [C37, C38, C39]
Rozhin, Shariy	Not a takedown; under Ukrainian sanctions	OpenSanctions records [C40, C41]
RT	State media; no takedown match for this content	None found
Look-alike channels, condottieros, mikle1on, Legitimny, Taynaya Kantselyariya	No match found	None found

Our checks of the named reports, 22 Nov 2026.

We saw none of the markers of Storm-1516 (fake news sites and staged videos), Doppelganger (cloned Western media) or Matryoshka (fake fact-check requests tagging fact-checkers); a search of X for Kaliningrad posts tagging 11 fact-checking accounts returned nothing [C42].

6.3 Sites

Table 5. Site links we found, checked 22 Nov 2026

Sites	Shared identifier	Second signal	Confidence
news-pravda.com and its Polish and Lithuanian sites	Yandex Metrica 97376635	Named as the Pravda network by the EEAS, DFRLab and Google [C34, C35, C36]	High
Four Russian regional news sites	Same server address and adjacent Mail.ru counters	Sequential article numbers on the same story; one site's contact address on another's page	High, same operator
A news site created in July 2026 that ran the "object from Lithuania" story	Its own Google and Yandex analytics IDs	No other site found with the same IDs	Low

Page source, WHOIS and DNS records collected 22 Nov 2026 [C42].

The four regional sites ran neutral news with a few hundred views each and look like a commercial aggregator. We could not tie them to the Russian state.

07

Counter-claims and manipulated media

The Iran photo cut both ways. We found 87 posts calling it fake, with 387,584 views, against six sharing it as real, with 4,367 [C42]. Pro-Kremlin accounts then used the debunk to dismiss the whole incident as a Ukrainian information operation [C29]. Some pro-Ukrainian and Polish accounts called the alert a Russian provocation or false flag; we found no evidence for that either [C42]. A Ukrainian news site's headline spoke of "unknown targets from NATO", repeating the frame in error [C43]. Rybar, a large pro-Kremlin channel, argued on 22 November that "flying through Poland" was too simple an explanation, a rare internal pushback [C19]. Russian state media described Lithuania's denial with "allegedly" [C6].

We found no AI-generated images or video about the incident in our sample.

08

What to do and what to watch

Table 6. Countermeasures

Actor	Practical steps
Polish and Lithuanian governments	Publish method with reach figures so others can check them. Pre-bunk the pattern: the next strike on a Russian Baltic target will again be blamed on Polish or Lithuanian airspace within hours [C9, C12]. Name the channels that set the frame.
German government and Bundeswehr	Expect each visible move for Grand Eagle 26, which runs to 3 December, to be tied to Kaliningrad; publish routes and timings where safe [C30].
Telegram	Act on channels impersonating public figures that post in the same second [C42].
X	Add context to high-reach posts asserting NATO strikes on Russia; one account with under 3,000 followers drew 207,571 views [C42].
Newsrooms	Avoid repeating "from NATO" or "from Lithuania" in headlines without attribution [C43]. Link to Lithuania's denial when quoting the governor [C3, C5].

Our recommendations, based on the evidence cited.

Table 7. Watch specification

Element	Specification
Sources	condottieros, mikle1on, Kots, Podolyaka, Shariy, Rozhin, Rybar, Tsargrad, RT and the look-alike channels on Telegram; Pravda Polska, Lithuania and Germany; Kaliningrad's governor; X counts for Kaliningrad in Polish, Lithuanian, German, Russian and English [C42].
Tripwires	A new drone alert or strike in Kaliningrad or on a Baltic ship; the foreign ministry naming Lithuania, Poland or NATO; more than 20 claim posts in an hour; Pravda Polska running more than five Kaliningrad items in a day; a look-alike burst carrying a claim.
Cadence	Hourly counts during an incident, daily otherwise, until 3 December.
Output	A short note with the item, link, time, our assessment and what to watch next.

Our design.

09

Forecasts

Table 8. Forecasts, made 22 Nov 2026

Id	Outcome	Probability	Resolves by	Key signals; what would change our view
KL1	Russia's foreign ministry or the Kremlin spokesman says Lithuania, Poland or NATO enabled, launched or took part in the 21 Nov incident	55%	30 Nov 2026	Governor's Lithuania line [C4]; Zakharova's October claim [C7]; a ministry briefing would raise it, treating it as a Ukrainian attack only would lower it
KL2	Russian officials announce another Kaliningrad drone alert or attack and link it to Lithuania, Poland or NATO airspace	40%	31 Dec 2026	The 21 Nov alert [C4]; new Baltic strikes would raise it, a quiet December lower it
KL3	A platform, the EEAS or DFRLab publicly names a network that pushed these claims	10%	31 Mar 2027	Most reach was on Telegram, which rarely publishes takedowns [C42]
KL4	TASS, RIA Novosti or RT claims German troops in Poland or Lithuania were involved in the incident	35%	15 Dec 2026	RT's German-aircraft post [C16]; Grand Eagle 26 news would raise it

Our assessment. Logged as F-20261122-KL1 to KL4.

10

Limitations

Our data is a sample. X searches return a subset of posts and stop early, so we use X's own counts for volumes. Telegram posts came from five keyword searches and about 50 channels, not all of Telegram, and we could not see closed groups, VK or MAX. Threads returned little. A language model coded the posts and we checked a random 40 by hand; 30 held up. Views are not unique readers. Posts deleted before collection are missing. Times are UK time, which is UTC.

02

Methodology

Reviewed 22 November 2026, UK time (UTC). Scope. Posts from 00:00 on 21 November to about 20:00 on 22 November 2026, in Russian, English, Polish, German, Lithuanian and Ukrainian, with X counts from 00:00 on 20 November. Coverage. X: 1,601 original posts from 1,179 accounts, from 21 keyword searches in six languages, plus official X counts for seven queries. Telegram: 1,849 posts from five keyword searches and recent posts from about 50 channels. TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, Bluesky, Reddit and Gab: 610 posts in the window from 13 queries each. Open web news: six news searches. Pravda network: the Polish, Lithuanian, German and main sites, read directly. Commercial social-data tools were used; costs are recorded internally. Coding. A language model coded each post for whether its author pushed each claim, relayed it as news or rebutted it, and for the author's stance. We count a post as pushing a claim when the stance is pro-Kremlin and at least one claim is pushed. We read the 45 most-viewed such posts and a random 40. Coordination. Copy chains: the first 25 words after cleaning, matched across three or more accounts, with 60-second and one-hour windows. Bursts: the first 20 words, three or more Telegram channels within 10 seconds. Accounts: creation date against all accounts in the sample. Sites. Page source for analytics and advertising identifiers, DNS over HTTPS and WHOIS. A link needs a shared identifier and a second signal. Fact check. A second model, run separately from the writer, re-checked every figure and date against the sources without seeing our conclusions. Naming. Officials, public figures, outlets and channels are named. Private individuals and accounts under 10,000 followers are described, not named.

03

Evidence register

Each code in square brackets in the text links to its row here. Each row gives the full source and its address.

C1 Paweł Olszewski on X, list of four false claims (in Polish), 22 Nov 2026, 06:57. x.com/PawelOlszewski/status/2124396804326248528

C2 Paweł Olszewski on X, update on reach (in Polish), 22 Nov 2026, 15:10. x.com/PawelOlszewski/status/2124520873176527156

C3 Kęstutis Budrys on X, Lithuania rejects false claims, 21 Nov 2026, 22:40. x.com/BudrysKestutis/status/2124271796820029653

C4 Izvestia on Telegram, governor on "a suspicious object from Lithuania" (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 17:39. t.me/izvestia/257085

C5 Euromaidan Press, Russia tied its Kaliningrad drone scare to Lithuania; Vilnius says the viral fire photos came from Iran, 22 Nov 2026. euromaidanpress.com/2026/11/22/russia-tied-its-kaliningrad-drone-scare-to-lit...

C6 RIA Novosti, Lithuania's foreign ministry statement (in Russian), 22 Nov 2026. ria.ru/20261122/litva-2133203859.html

C7 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, briefing by Maria Zakharova (in Russian), 16 Oct 2026. mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2155223

C8 PAP, deputy digital minister on monitoring after the Kaliningrad reports (in Polish), 22 Nov 2026. pap.pl/aktualnosci/atak-na-obwod-krolewiecki-wiceminister-cyfryzacji-informac...

C9 condottieros on Telegram, drones "through Poland and Lithuania" (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 10:31. t.me/condottieros/22163

C10 Alexander Kots on Telegram, "Rehearsal of a Kaliningrad blockade" (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 13:57. t.me/sashakots/65991

C11 Yuri Podolyaka on Telegram, copy of the Kots post (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 14:09. t.me/yurasumy/30133

C12 Anatoly Shariy on Telegram, "only through Poland or Lithuania" (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 18:48. t.me/asupersharij/62751

C13 mikle1on on Telegram, "physical blockade" post (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 12:05. t.me/mikle1on/55391

C14 Taynaya Kantselyariya on Telegram, provocation to pull the EU into war (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 18:58. t.me/taynaya_kantselyariya/14721

C15 Legitimny on Telegram, "new provocative cases for escalation" (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 16:32. t.me/legitimniy/23995

C16 RT on Telegram, German Air Force aircraft before the ship attack (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 13:50. t.me/rt_russian/299740

C17 Boris Rozhin on Telegram, "What happened in Kaliningrad?" (in Russian), 22 Nov 2026, 08:45. t.me/boris_rozhin/234317

C18 Tsargrad on Telegram, "What really happened near Kaliningrad?" (in Russian), 22 Nov 2026, 06:36. t.me/tsargradtv/147570

C19 Rybar on Telegram, on "drones flying through Poland" (in Russian), 22 Nov 2026, 07:49. t.me/rybar/84861

C20 Yury Barantchik on Telegram, "Kaliningrad tested for a blockade" (in Russian), 21 Nov 2026, 14:01. t.me/barantchik/42822

C21 Ethan Levins on X, drones from "NATO territory", 21 Nov 2026, 18:53. x.com/EthanLevins2/status/2124214539470209491

C22 Ethan Levins on X, follow-up post, 21 Nov 2026, 19:20. x.com/EthanLevins2/status/2124221520339935383

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